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COMMENT
A PROPOSAL TO DENY FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
TO NATIONS SPONSORING TERRORISM
Catherine M. Beresovski*
INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 1985, French secret service agents bombed the Rainbow
Warrior, a ship owned by Greenpeace.1 The bomb killed one crew
member and destroyed the boat.2 Prior to the bombing, the vessel was
docked in Auckland Harbor, New Zealand, preparing for a voyage to
Mururoa Atoll to protest French nuclear testing in the South Pacific.3
On September 22, 1985, the French government admitted that it had
orchestrated the attack on the Rainbow Warrior.4 France then began
discussions with Greenpeace to ascertain adequate compensation for
Greenpeace's injury.5 When the parties were unable to agree, they de-
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Meisler, France Probing Charges Its Agents Sank Protest Ship, L.A. Times,
Aug. 9, 1985, at 30 (noting that Greenpeace is a private international organization
dedicated to environmental protection and nuclear disarmament).
2. See generally D. ROBIE, EYES OF FIRE, THE LAST VOYAGE OF THE RMNEOW
WARIuoa (1986) (recounting the French bombing of the Rainbow Warrior).
3. Branigin, Antinuclear Tensions Gain in Pacific, Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1985, at
A25 (analyzing the growing antinuclear sentiment that is causing friction between Pa-
cific nations and western powers).
4. See Bernstein, France Concedes its Agents Sank Greenpeace Boat, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Bernstein, France Concedes] (reporting France's ad-
mission that its intelligence service sank the Rainbow Warrior); Shabecoff, France
Must Pay Greenpeace $8 Million in Sinking of Ship, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1987, at A2
(commenting that the Rainbow Warrior affair provoked an international scandal that
damaged relations between France and New Zealand); Lewis, Paris Paper Says the
French Sank Greenpeace Boat, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at 1 (reporting the find-
ings of Le Monde, which revealed that French military saboteurs bombed the Rainbow
Warrior).
5. Pugh, Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair, 36 INT'L & Co,p. L.Q.
655, 657-58 (1987). While France was negotiating with Greenpeace, it was also negoti-
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cided to refer their dispute to arbitration.6 The arbitral tribunal or-
dered France to pay Greenpeace U.S. $8 million, an unusually large
award.'
Arbitration was the most viable means for Greenpeace to secure just
compensation from France. If Greenpeace had attempted to file suit
against France in a New Zealand domestic court, France probably
would have invoked sovereign immunity8 to defeat the court's jurisdic-
tion over France." While it is uncertain whether France would have
won the sovereign immunity argument, the proceedings would have
delayed a settlement even further. Thus, arbitration was the crucial
method that allowed Greenpeace to avoid jurisdictional barriers to ad-
judication and to obtain a settlement through non-judicial means.
The Rainbow Warrior affair established an important precedent for
holding nations responsible to private parties for state-sponsored terror-
ating with New Zealand to determine adequate compensation for violating New Zea-
land's territorial waters and to decide the fate of the French secret service agents de-
tained in New Zealand. Id. at 657. When negotiations between the two countries
faltered, France and New Zealand decided to submit the dispute to the United Nations
Secretary General for a binding arbitral award. Id.
6. Clark, State Terrorism: Some Lessons from the Sinking of the "Rainbow War-
rior", 20 RUTGERs L.J. 393, 400 (1989) (stating that the parties agreed to submit their
dispute to arbitration when good faith negotiations to determine compensation failed);
see Shabecoff, supra note 4, at A2 (reporting that the arbitration agreement signed
between France and New Zealand established that each party would choose one mem-
ber of the tribunal). If the two countries could not agree on the third member, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal would nominate him or her. Id. Pursuant to this agreement, the
three people chosen for the tribunal were Professor Terre of France, Justice Wood-
house of New Zealand, and Professor Reymonde of Switzerland. Clark, supra, at 400.
7. See Shabecoff, supra note 4, at A2 (noting that the arbitral award specified that
France should pay U.S. $5 million for the destruction of the Rainbow Warrior, U.S.
$1.2 million for "aggravated damages," and U.S. $1.9 million for the legal fees, ex-
penses, and interest). Lloyd Cutler, counsel for Greenpeace, remarked that large
awards for aggravated damages are generally given only when the illegal conduct war-
rants special condemnation. Id.; see La Nouvelle Affaire Greenpeace, MINUTE, Aug.
20, 1987, at 1-2 (reporting that the 32-year old Rainbow Warrior was worth 40 times
less than the U.S. $5 million that Greenpeace requested for the construction of a new
vessel); Clark, supra note 6, at 401 (noting that only the amount of the award became
public knowledge).
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979) (defining sovereign immu-
nity as the doctrine which prevents a private party from asserting an otherwise merito-
rious claim against a foreign state in a court of law, unless that state consents to the
suit); Interview with Michael Van Walt, counsel for Greenpeace, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 2, 1989) [hereinafter Van Walt Interview] (explaining that arbitration allowed
Greenpeace to receive compensation without having to defeat the sovereign immunity
plea France would probably have raised had Greenpeace attempted to sue France in a
New Zealand court); infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text (discussing the basic
premises of the sovereign immunity doctrine).
9. Telephone interview with Duncan Currie, General Counsel for Greenpeace In-
ternational, in the Netherlands (Oct. 18, 1989) [hereinafter Currie Interview] (discuss-
ing why it would have been difficult for Greenpeace to sue France in New Zealand).
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ism. 10 Historically, private entities were unable to sue foreign govern-
ments for their tortious acts because of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine.1 Under this doctrine, a domestic court does not have jurisdiction
to adjudicate claims against a foreign government.
1 2
The sovereign immunity doctrine does not necessarily grant absolute
immunity, however. Capitalist countries"3 generally follow the restric-
tive theory of immunity, whereby governments are immune from
claims based on governmental acts-jure imperli-but not from claims
arising out of acts that private entities perform-jure gestionis.1 4 The
jure gestionis activities primarily cover commercial transactions that
foreign governments undertake. This constitutes the commercial excep-
tion to the sovereign immunity doctrine.1"
In addition to this well-known commercial torts exception, several
state statutes,1 6 a multilateral convention," and two international com-
10. See Shabecoff, supra note 4, at A2; infra note 52 and accompanying text (con-
firming that the arbitration between France and Greenpeace was the first arbitration
involving a non-commercial tort committed by a state); Van Walt Interview, supra
note 8 (explaining the important precedent that the arbitration between France and
Greenpeace established and recounting that France agreed to arbitration after Green-
peace threatened to sue France in a New Zealand court).
11. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1252 (noting that states have
traditionally enjoyed foreign sovereign immunity from tort liability).
12. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SrIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 892
(1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW] (explaining that jurisdictional immunity
arises when a claim is brought in the court of one state against another state).
13. See Trooboff, Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200
RECUBIL DES Couas 252, 271 (1986) (discussing the seven countries that passed legis-
lation adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity). The United States was
the first country to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Id. Subsequently, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Singapore, South Africa, Pakistan, and Canada enacted statutes that codi-
fied the restrictive theory as well. Id.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 451 comment a (1986) [hereinafter THIRD RLESTATEMENT]. See Weber, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE
STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 18 (1976) (explaining that judicial practice, bilateral
treaties, multilateral conventions, and the writings of publicists all indicate that a state
is not immune from jurisdiction for activities that are private, commercial, or jure ges-
tionis, while it is immune for activities that are governmental, sovereign, or jure
imperii).
15. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 453 comment a (affirming that under
the restrictive theory, foreign states are not immune from suits concerning commercial
activity).
16. See Comment, Immunity of States for Noncommercial Torts: A Comparative
Analysis of the International Law Commission's Draft, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1849, 1851
n.7 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Immunity of States] (noting that the United States,
United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, South Africa, and Canada codified the non-
commercial torts exception); infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the state
statutes that adopt the non-commercial torts exception to sovereign immunity).
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missions" each have established a non-commercial torts exception to
sovereign immunity. The non-commercial torts exception covers acts
which cause "injury to persons or damage to property." 19 This excep-
tion is based on the need for private parties tortiously injured by for-
eign governments to have access to judicial remedies. 20 The availability
of judicial remedies is particularly important because sovereign immu-
nity does not affect a state's international responsibility.21 While sover-
eign immunity grants immunity from jurisdiction, it does not grant im-
munity from substantive liability. 2
This Comment suggests that nations should re-examine the sovereign
immunity doctrine in the context of political terrorism so that legiti-
mate claims under international law may be satisfied. Part I analyzes
the Rainbow Warrior affair and suggests that it establishes a strong
precedent for holding nations liable to private parties for state-spon-
sored terrorism. Part II examines the sovereign immunity doctrine and
discusses the restrictive theory of the doctrine which encompasses the
commercial and non-commercial torts exceptions. In addition, Part II
argues that courts must devise a method of enforcing judgments
against foreign governments. Part III recommends that domestic courts
should assume jurisdiction over nations sponsoring terrorism. Alterna-
tively, Part III proposes that victims of non-commercial torts should
use international arbitration as a means of receiving compensation.
17. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the European Convention
on State Immunity).
18. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (addressing the International
Law Commission's and International Law Association's adoption of the restrictive the-
ory of immunity).
19. See infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text (discussing the injury to persons
or damage to property exception to sovereign immunity).
20. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 391 introductory note (explaining
that absolute immunity is neither required nor desirable under international law when
it denies parties a judicial remedy).
21. See infra note 62 and accompanying text (reiterating that sovereign immunity
laws pertain to jurisdictional immunity and not immunity from liability); Trooboff,
supra note 13, at 254 (stating that sovereign immunity does not shield states from their
international legal responsibility to other states); see also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 357 (1966) (elaborating that an act which is a prima
facie breach of a legal obligation engenders state responsibility under international law,
regardless of whether the obligation stems from a treaty, custom, or other source). The
law of state responsibility may require the payment of compensation for damages
caused by illegal acts. Id. at 354.
22. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 21, at 354 (stressing that sovereign immunity is
merely a jurisdictional principle).
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I. A CASE STUDY: THE RAINBOW WARRIOR AFFAIR
A. FRANCE'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
When agents of France's secret service, the Direction Gkngrale des
Services Ext~rieurs, bombed the Greenpeace vessel, France became in-
ternationally responsible for its illegal action. 3 France was unable to
deny that responsibility when the New Zealand police discovered that
senior government officials had ordered the attack.4 Furthermore, the
French government remained internationally responsible for the bomb-
ing irrespective of the sentencing and punishment of the two French
agents25 that the New Zealand police arrested.
20
France was responsible for the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior on
two separate accounts. First, France violated New Zealand's territorial
sovereignty. 7 Second, in addition to France's responsibility vis-a-vis
New Zealand, France was liable to Greenpeace for the destruction of
the Rainbow Warrior.
2 8
23. Id. at 394 (affirming that France became internationally responsible for violat-
ing international law and New Zealand's territorial sovereignty).
24. See Dobbs, Hernu on Comeback Trail, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 1985, at A14
(stating that incriminating press articles and the New Zealand criminal investigation
caused France to admit that its agents sank the Greenpeace vessel); Bernstein, France
Blames 2 Aides in Ship Raid, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1985, at 12 [hereinafter Bern-
stein, France Blames] (reporting the admission by the French prime minister, Laurent
Fabius, that the defense minister, Charles Hernu, and the head of the secret services
agency, Pierre Lacoste, were responsible for the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior).
25. See Reed, Rainbow's End, TIME, July 21, 1986, at 24 (reporting that New
Zealand initially sentenced each French agent to a ten-year prison term in New Zea-
land); United Nations Secretary General: Ruling Pertaining to the Differences Between
France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, July 6, 1986, at
1370, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1346 (1987) [hereinafter U.N. Ruling] (concluding that
France negotiated for the release of the agents from the New Zealand jail, and the
United Nations Secretary General finally ruled that the agents would be delivered to
French military authorities and then transferred to a French military facility on a Pa-
cific island).
26. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 664 (arguing that one of the notable aspects of the
Greenpeace affair is that New Zealand secured redress from both the French agents
and the French government).
27. See International Law and the Sinking of the "Rainbow Warrior", 60 AUSTRA-
UAN L.J. 51, 52 (1986) [hereinafter Sinking the Rainbow Warrior] (establishing that
every nation has an international obligation to refrain from conducting activities on
another nation's territory without that nation's consent); Wexler, The Rainbow War-
rior Affair: State and Agent Responsibility for Authorized Violations of International
Law, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389, 392 (1987) (asserting that France's bombing of the Green-
peace vessel in New Zealand's territorial waters without New Zealand's consent vio-
lated the latter's right to freedom from outside intervention); Clark, supra note 6, at
401 (explaining that New Zealand argued that France was internationally responsible
for the bombing because it violated New Zealand's sovereignty and the Charter of the
United Nations).
28. Sinking the Rainbow Warrior, supra note 27, at 52 (affirming that France was
responsible to Greenpeace for France's breach of international law when it destroyed
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Once France conceded its responsibility vis-a-vis New Zealand, the
two countries began negotiations to determine the compensation that
France owed New Zealand and to decide the sentencing of the French
agents.2 9 When the two countries were unable to reach an agreement,
the United Nations Secretary General referred the dispute to an arbi-
tral tribunal, which issued a binding award.30 The resolution of the po-
litical and legal impasse between France and New Zealand indicates
that arbitration is a viable means of recognizing state responsibility and
overcoming sovereign immunity obstacles to solving international dis-
putes.3 1 It is unlikely that a New Zealand court would have granted
immunity to France if New Zealand had filed suit in one of its domes-
tic courts because New Zealand would have asserted territorial sover-
eignty.32 Nevertheless, the resort to arbitration avoided the sovereign
immunity problem entirely.
33
France's consent to submit the conflict with Greenpeace to an arbi-
tral tribunal prevented it from raising a sovereign immunity defense.34
The arbitration between France and Greenpeace confirmed France's re-
sponsibility for damaging Greenpeace's property and enabled Green-
peace to collect damages.3 5 Greenpeace, a private party, sought redress
the Rainbow Warrior). France was also liable to the family of the dead crew member.
Id.; see Sinking of Vessel is Laid to a Bomb, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1985, at 3 (con-
firming that the explosion of the Rainbow Warrior killed Fernando Pereira, a Portu-
guese-born Dutch citizen); U.N. Ruling, supra note 25, at 1346 (revealing that the
United Nations Secretary General ordered France to pay 2,300,000 French Francs to
Pereira's family).
29. Bernstein, Greenpeace Case Yields New Dispute, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at
A8 [hereinafter Bernstein, Greenpeace Case] (discussing New Zealand's and France's
negotiations, which began September 23, 1985, and led to the dropping of murder
charges against the two French agents).
30. See generally U.N. Ruling, supra note 25 (setting forth the terms of the arbi-
tral award); Pugh, supra note 5, at 657 (describing the provisions of the Secretary
General's award); see also Wexler, supra note 27, at 399-411 (analyzing the arbitral
award and discussing why France and New Zealand agreed to arbitration).
31. Wexler, supra note 27, at 391 (arguing that arbitration offers a peaceful solu-
tion to international disputes).
32. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (noting that territorial sover-
eignty takes precedence over a claim of sovereign immunity).
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (analyzing why France agreed to
waive a potential claim of sovereign immunity and accept arbitration).
35. See Braitberg, Greenpeace: Et la France Devra Rembourser les Ecolos, Le
Quotidien de Paris, Sept. 3, 1987, at 19 (reporting that on Dec. 23, 1985, the French
government signed an arbitration agreement with Greenpeace whereby it assumed re-
sponsibility for the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior and agreed to compensate Green-
peace in the amount that the arbitral tribunal determined). France and Greenpeace
stipulated in their agreement that the arbitration would be binding on both parties. Id.;




from a sovereign nation. If Greenpeace had attempted to sue France in
a New Zealand court, it could not have countered France's potential
sovereign immunity defense with a territorial sovereignty claim. Thus,
Greenpeace's success in recovering damages was an even stronger en-
dorsement for resolving international conflicts through arbitration than
was New Zealand's success, since Greenpeace did not have the advan-
tage of being a sovereign state.
B. GREENPEACE'S VICTORY OVER SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Several reasons underlay France's concession to withhold a sovereign
immunity claim if Greenpeace agreed to arbitration. First, France was
determined to avoid a public trial that would reveal detailed evidence
of the French secret service operation. 6 While Greenpeace would have
had difficulty suing France in a New Zealand court if France had as-
serted sovereign immunity, it is unclear whether France would have
won the sovereign immunity argument. Thus, France feared that
Greenpeace would successfully file suit in New Zealand, where the
judges would not be amenable to the French position. 8
Second, France agreed to arbitration because it wanted the New
Zealand authorities to release the French agents. 9 New Zealand as-
serted in its negotiations with France that no settlement between the
two countries would be possible unless France offered adequate com-
pensation to Greenpeace. 40 Furthermore, if France had not agreed to
resolve the dispute through arbitration, Greenpeace could have pursued
36. See Bernstein, Greenpeace Case, supra note 29, at A8 (explaining that France
did not want its agents tried in New Zealand to avoid a public hearing of evidence
against the French government).
37. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 662 (stating that if Greenpeace had attempted to
bring the French government to trial in New Zealand, the New Zealand court may
have had jurisdiction over France because New Zealand follows the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity).
38. See Shabecoff, supra note 4, at A2 (stating that France consented to arbitra-
tion when Greenpeace threatened to sue the French government in a New Zealand
domestic court).
39. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 399 (claiming that securing the release of the
French agents from the New Zealand authorities was one of France's primary con-
cerns); Bernstein, Greenpeace Case, supra note 29, at A8 (repeating the claim made by
the French Foreign Minister that France would make every possible effort to ensure
the release of the two agents).
40. See U.N. Ruling, supra note 25, at 1346-47 (indicating that New Zealand
would not settle with France unless France paid sufficient damages to Greenpeace and
unless binding arrangements existed to ensure that satisfactory compensation would be
given).
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legal action on its own initiative to prevent the agents from leaving
New Zealand.4'
Third, political considerations played a crucial role in France's deci-
sion to submit to arbitration. Tremendous pressure existed within
France for the French government to settle with Greenpeace as quickly
as possible. The Rainbow Warrior affair, ironically referred to as "Un-
derWatergate," 42 was deemed the worst political crisis since the Social-
ists came to power in 1981. 4 1 Opposition leaders of the Right de-
manded resignations of senior government officials, 44 including Prime
Minister Laurent Fabius and President Mitterrand.4' The Socialists
feared for their seats in the National Assembly as they faced legislative
elections the following March."
The international community also urged France to solve the crisis
speedily through arbitration. The Greenpeace affair received extensive
news coverage, and nations around the world condemned the bomb-
ing.47 When France launched an economic embargo of New Zealand
products, 48 the European Community encouraged France to settle with
41. Currie Interview, supra note 9 (assessing France's incentives to submit to arbi-
tration rather than attempt to defend a suit in a New Zealand court).
42. Smart, French Newspaper Stirs Up Trouble for Mitterrand, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Sept. 19, 1985, at 9 (remarking that the bungled Rainbow Warrior spy mis-
sion and government cover-up created a French "UnderWatergate"); Le Watergate,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at 18 (mocking the French political crisis as a mortifying
repeat of the American Watergate).
43. Bernstein, France Blames, supra note 24, at 12 (addressing press reports that
discredited government assertions that Prime Minister Laurent Fabius and President
Mitterrand had no advance knowledge of the bombing).
44. Smart, supra note 42, at 9 (describing President Mitterrand's government as
plagued by complete disarray).
45. Bernstein, France Concedes, supra note 4, at 1 (predicting that the political
uproar was likely to continue until the French government publicly revealed the entire
truth about the Rainbow Warrior affair).
46. French Confession, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1985, at A20 (pondering how the
political scandal would affect the forthcoming legislative elections in March 1986); Le
Watergate, supra note 42, at 18 (stating that it was expected that the Socialists would
lose their majority in Parliament and would have to govern with the opposition); Bern-
stein, France Concedes, supra note 4, at 1 (remarking that President Mitterrand's most
serious problem was not the bombing but rather the plummeting credibility of officials
who were asserting that the government was not involved in the attack).
47. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 666 (noting that the European Parliament criticized
France's attack on the Rainbow Warrior).
48. Lewis, Sanctions Can Work, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1986, at A23 (reporting that
France banned the import of New Zealand wool and lamb brains into France and
threatened to prevent New Zealand from selling butter to the European Community);
Pugh, supra note 5, at 667 (stating that France admitted that it was banning New
Zealand produce from importation for non-commercial reasons). New Zealand exports
to France decreased by approximately forty percent from January to April 1986. Id.
On April 4, 1986, the European Community Trade Commissioner upheld New Zea-
land's claim that France was obstructing New Zealand imports. Id. at 657.
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New Zealand and Greenpeace before the conflict escalated further.4
Finally, because the Rainbow Warrior was an English ship, the bomb-
ing placed the United Kingdom in a delicate position vis-a-vis its
French ally.50 The United Kingdom sought to avoid protracted tensions
with France and consequently exhorted the French government to settle
with New Zealand and Greenpeace expeditiously.5'
As a result, France decided that waiving a potential claim of sover-
eign immunity and agreeing to arbitration were in its best interest. The
arbitration between France and Greenpeace became the first arbitra-
tion over a non-commercial tort between a foreign sovereign and a pri-
vate party.52 While the details of the arbitration remain secret, the
amount of the award, totalling U.S. $8 million, was released to the
public. 53
The Rainbow Warrior affair supports the proposition that states
which pursue terrorism must be held internationally accountable for
their tortious acts.54 Moreover, states conducting illegal activities owe a
duty to compensate individuals and private organizations as well as
other sovereign nations. 5 Thus, the Greenpeace ease sets a strong pre-
cedent for preventing states from asserting sovereign immunity in in-
stances of state-sponsored terrorism.
49. Currie Interview, supra note 9 (commenting that Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minis-
ter of the Netherlands and President of the European Council of Ministers, was one of
the heads of state that met with the French Prime Minister to encourage a speedy
settlement).
50. Pugh, supra note 5, at 666 (explaining that the United Kingdom refused to
initiate judicial proceedings against France to avoid aggravating the situation).
51. See id. (explaining that although the United Kingdom, an ally of both France
and New Zealand, had initially remained passive, Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime
Minister, eventually urged France to settle the dispute quickly).
52. See Shabecoff, supra note 4, at A2 (noting that Greenpeace's attorney, Lloyd
Cutler, affirmed that this arbitral agreement was the first resolution of a non-commer-
cial tort dispute between a sovereign nation and a private entity through arbitration).
53. See Implique dans L'Affaire Greenpeace, Dominique Prleur Promue Com-
mandant, Le Monde, July 12, 1989, at 10 (announcing that France financed Green-
peace's new vessel, replacing the old Rainbow Warrior with the U.S. S8 million award
payment).
54. See Clark, supra note 6, at 413 (arguing that the international community
must recognize state responsibility in instances of government-sponsored terrorism); see
also French Confession, supra note 46, at A20 (repeating New Zealand's assertion
that the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior was state-sponsored terrorism).
55. French Confession, supra note 46, at A20.
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II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. ORIGINS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE ABSOLUTE THEORY
Under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a domestic court
may not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign nation." A sovereign can-
not be made a defendant in a local court of another nation without the
sovereign's consent.57 If, however, a state waives its right to immunity,
the domestic court of a foreign country may subject that state to its
own judicial process.58
This principle stems from the fundamental equality and indepen-
dence of states.59 Because all nations are considered equal, one nation
cannot exercise its sovereign power over another.60 Furthermore, states
traditionally have hesitated to sue foreign countries in their domestic
courts to avoid damaging their economic and political ties with those
foreign nations. 1
56. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, To DEFINE THE JURISDICTION OF U.S.
COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1976) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, De-
partment of State) (explaining the history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
the United States); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, To DEFINE THE JURISDICTION
OF U.S. COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES: HEARINGS ON H.R. 11315
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]
(explaining the essence of the absolute immunity theory while offering historical back-
ground on the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
57. Letter from Acting Legal Adviser Jack Tate to the Acting Attorney General
(May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate
Letter] (summarizing the old theory of absolute immunity); see Weber, supra note 14,
at 29 (stating that international law applying the absolute immunity theory only pros-
cribes domestic exercises of jurisdiction over foreign states that have not consented to
adjudication).
58. See infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (discussing how implicit and
explicit waivers nullify a state's right to sovereign immunity).
59. See Trooboff, supra note 13, at 252 (noting that foreign sovereign immunity
has its roots in state sovereignty and the equality of states). The doctrine is founded on
the principle that all states are equally sovereign, and consequently one state cannot
exert its will over another. Id. see also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (holding that the French government was immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States when French agents seized an Ameri-
can ship and transformed it into a warship); SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 10
(explaining that The Schooner Exchange is famous for being the first case to recognize
the principle of sovereign immunity in the United States); Comment, Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory
Norms of International Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 378-79 (1989) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Implied Waiver] (discussing the pivotal role of The Schooner Exchange in the
development of sovereign immunity in the United States).
60. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 21, at 250 (explaining that because states are
equal and possess legal personality, sovereignty is a legal relationship to other states).
61. See Weber, supra note 14, at 2 (criticizing the United States State Depart-
ment's predisposition for granting immunity to certain foreign sovereigns to further the
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While the sovereign immunity doctrine prevents a foreign state from
being tried in the domestic court of another nation, every state remains
liable for its international law violations.62 Sovereign immunity does
not destroy legal obligations. 3 It merely prevents domestic courts from
asserting adjudicatory jurisdiction over foreign states." Thus, even
when a nation successfully asserts sovereign immunity, it remains sub-
stantively liable for its illegal acts.
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TODAY: THE RESTRICTIVE THEORY
Today most states follow the restrictive approach to sovereign immu-
nity65 which limits immunity to suits involving a state's public acts.
This approach does not extend immunity to suits involving a state's
commercial or private acts. 68 The restrictive theory gained broad ac-
Department's own institutional goals and placate those nations exhibiting hostility to-
wards the United States).
62. See I. BROWNUE, supra note 21, at 282 (emphasizing that under the sovereign
immunity doctrine, foreign states are immune from local jurisdiction but not from legal
responsibility). Sovereign immunity does not address the merits of a claim, but rather
it attempts to designate the appropriate forum for the litigant's cause of action. Id.
63. See TmRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 451 comment b (explaining that the
sovereign immunity doctrine neither creates nor destroys legal obligations).
64. Id.
65. See Comment, Implied Waiver, supra note 59, at 380 (recounting the evolution
of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity into the restrictive theory); Report of the
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Thirty-fifth Session, [1983]
2 Y.B. IN'L L. CObz'N 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.l (Part 2) [here-
inafter I.L.C. Commission Report] (stating that when a claim concerns one of the ac-
cepted exceptions to immunity, a domestic court has jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign regardless of whether that sovereign has consented to the proceedings).
In some contexts, the term "restrictive theory" describes the approach to immunity
which distinguishes claims arising out of governmental activities from claims arising
out of activities of a private nature, such as commercial acts. TmRaD RESTATII.!ENT,
supra note 14, § 451 comment a. In other contexts, the phrase may more generally
denote any approach differing from the absolute theory of immunity. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Law Commission, Fifth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/363/Add.1 (1983) [hereinafter Fifth Report
of the I.L.C.] (referring interchangeably to the "more restrictive principle" and the
"less absolute principle" of state immunity). This Comment intends the term "restric-
tive approach" to denote all non-absolute theories of immunity, regardless of whether
they encompass the distinction between commercial and governmental activities.
66. SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 9; HousE REPoRT, supra note 56, at 25;
United States of America Questionnaire on the Topic "Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property," reprinted in Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property, at 630, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20, U.N. Sales No.
EF.81V.10(1982) [hereinafter United States Questionnaire] (explaining that the FSIA
allows foreign immunity when suits concern public acts, but it denies immunity when
claims involve private or commercial acts); United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland Questionnaire on the Topic "Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property," reprinted in Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, supra at 624, 626, (1982) [hereinafter United Kingdom Question-
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ceptance in the twentieth century,6 7 as states increasingly engaged in
commercial activities.68 Immunity for states performing commercial
transactions with private entities was undesirable because it deprived
private parties of their judicial remedies. 9 As a result, the interna-
tional community felt that domestic courts should protect the rights of
parties conducting business transactions with foreign governments.10
Early in the twentieth century, several international conventions im-
plemented the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity for cases involv-
ing state vessels in commercial use.7 1 In 1972, the European Conven-
tion on State Immunity devoted fourteen articles to exceptions to the
naire] (affirming that the State Immunity Act distinguishes jure imperil activities,
which are conducted in the exercise of sovereign authority, from jure gestionis transac-
tions, which are not sovereign acts).
The rationale for the restrictive theory is that since commercial activities are gov-
erned by private law, a state operates outside the scope of sovereign authority when it
engages in commercial transactions. Comment, Implied Waiver, supra note 59, at 380.
The restrictive approach to immunity acknowledges the dual nature of the state as a
political power with sovereign privileges and as an entity capable of pursuing private
law relationships. Id. at 380 n.77.
67. See THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY,
REP. No. 24, at 51 (1984) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION] (not-
ing the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity during the 20th century). But see
Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity
for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doc-
trine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 238 (1983) (stating that the United States government
and the Supreme Court both rejected the theory of absolute immunity before the twen-
tieth century when the United States declared that it had jurisdiction over foreign ves-
sels and their commanders stationed in American ports).
68. Tate Letter, supra note 57, at 985; Weber, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining
that increases in the commercial activities of states and stronger demands for state
responsibility eliminated the absolute theory of immunity); see Trooboff, supra note 13,
at 268 (commenting that the Tate Letter, which announced that the State Department
of the United States would follow the restrictive theory, was a landmark shift in the
immunity policy of the United States). But see Loftis, Securing Arbitral Awards:
Waiving Immunity Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Ensuring Equi-
table Remedy by Pre-award Attachment Under the New York Convention, 9 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 235, 240 (1985) (criticizing the Tate Letter for failing to stipulate
how the State Department of the United States would distinguish between sovereign
and private state activities, and for neglecting to provide sufficient specificity).
69. TIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at 391 introductory note (explaining that
states adopted the restrictive theory in the twentieth century because it was undesirable
to insulate foreign nations acting like private parties from liability for their tortious
acts).
70. See Tate Letter, supra note 57, at 985 (articulating the reasons why the State
Department of the United States deemed it necessary to formally adopt the restrictive
theory of immunity).
71. See Weber, supra note 14, at 19 (describing the Brussels Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels of
1926, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, and the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969).
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principle of sovereign immunity.7 2 The Organization of American
States also drafted a convention which espoused the restrictive theory.7 3
In addition, the International Law Commission7 4 (I.L.C.) and the In-
ternational Law Association7 5 (I.L.A.) each proposed draft treaties
adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
72. European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74,
art. 11 [hereinafter European Convention] (codifying the non-commercial torts excep-
tion to foreign sovereign immunity); Chart Showing Signatures and Ratifications of
Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, DIRECTORATE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, 39 (1990) (indicating that the European
Convention entered into force on June 11, 1976 and was ratified by Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The
countries ratified the Convention in an effort to codify international law restricting sov-
ereign immunity. See European Convention, supra, preamble (announcing that the
Convention takes into account the tendency in international law to curtail state immu-
nity claims).
73. Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States, Jan.
21, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 292 (1983) [hereinafter Inter-American Draft Con-
vention]. While the Draft Convention has not entered into force as of the summer of
1990, it does indicate support within the Organization of American States for limiting
the sovereign immunity principle. See Fifth Report of the I.L.C., supra note 65, at 14
(citing the Inter-American Draft Convention as an example of regional efforts to adopt
the restrictive theory). Article 6(e) states that nations are not immune "in proceedings
for losses and damages on tort liabilities" arising from claims relating to trade or com-
mercial activities. Inter-American Draft Convention, supra, art. 6(e).
74. See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of States and Their Property, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 23, U.N. Doc.
A/41/498 (1986) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities] (present-
ing a set of draft articles to the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 in the
eighth and final report of the International Law Commission); TmiwR RESTATEEN-r,
supra note 14, at 391-92 (stating that the Commission issued eight reports, each of
which contained a provision granting domestic courts jurisdiction over sovereign nations
for non-commercial torts). In 1986, in its eighth and final report, the Commission ap-
proved articles for a proposed codification. Id.; see Comment, Immunity of States,
supra note 16, at 1851 (specifying that the I.L.C. began drafting articles on sovereign
immunity at the invitation of the United Nations in 1978); Franck & El Baradei, The
Codification and Progressive Development of International Law: A UNITAR Study of
the Role and Use of the International Law Commission, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 630, 630-
31 (1982) (stating that the I.L.C., as the main legislative organ of the United Nations,
encourages the codification of progressive developments in international law).
75. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFER-
ENCE HELD AT MONTREAL (1983) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAw AssoCiATIoN]
(adopting a Draft Convention which establishes a non-commercial torts exception to
sovereign immunity); Fifth Report of the LLC., supra note 65, at 15 (stating that the
International Law Association, a group of international attorneys from various legal
systems throughout the world, adopts the restrictive approach); Note, The Interna-
tional Law Association Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative
Approach, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 635, 639 (1983) [hereinafter Note, I.L.A. Convention]
(explaining that the I.L.A. Committee on State Immunity, established in 1979 by the
Executive Council of the I.L.A., issued a Draft Convention on sovereign immunity,
which the I.L.A. adopted at its sixtieth conference in Montreal, Canada, in 1982).
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Finally, seven nations enacted statutes that codified the restrictive
theory as well.76 These codifications further indicate that the general
trend in international law favors limiting sovereign immunity." The
United States was the first nation to codify its restrictive approach to
sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA). 78 Other nations subsequently used the statute of the United
States as a model for their own legislation, particularly with respect to
the FSIA's distinction between commercial and governmental activi-
ties.79 Furthermore, case law reveals that many nations have adopted
76. See, e.g., United States Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11
(1982) (codifying the restrictive immunity theory); United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland State Immunity Act, 1978, reprinted in Materials on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of States and Their Property, supra note 66, at 41, [hereinafter
U.K. State Immunity Act] (codifying the restrictive immunity theory); Australian For-
eign States Immunities Act, AUSTL. AcTs P. (1985) (codifying the restrictive immunity
theory).
77. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 11 (stating that
the practice of governments evidences a world-wide penchant towards restrictive immu-
nity); United States Questionnaire, supra note 66, at 630 (noting that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act codifies the restrictive principle of immunity which is cur-
rently followed in international law); United Kingdom Questionnaire, supra note 66, at
620-21 (explaining that the United Kingdom codified the restrictive theory in its State
Immunity Act to respect modern international law, which has rejected the absolute
theory of immunity embodied in old English case law); Letter Concerning the Topic of
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property Submitted by the United King-
dom Government to the Secretariat (July 3, 1979), reprinted in Materials on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of States and Their Property, supra note 66, at 96-97 (acknowledg-
ing that the State Immunity Act was necessary to bring English law into conformity
with obligations incurred under the European Convention on State Immunity, which is
viewed as an accurate reflection of general state practice in the area of immunity). In
addition, many nations which have not yet codified their law on sovereign immunity
have applied the restrictive principle for many years. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra
note 14, § 451 reporters' notes (stating that Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece,
Italy, and Switzerland have long practiced restrictive immunity).
78. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982); SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 56, at 9 (claiming that a main reason for enacting the FSIA was to
avoid excessive allowance of immunity). Previously, a nation seeking immunity asked
the Department of State to deliver a formal suggestion of immunity to the court. Id.
This process tended to encourage absolute immunity, since the State Department
sought to preserve friendly relations with foreign governments. Weber, supra note 14,
at 9; see Trooboff, supra note 13, at 269-71 (discussing why Congress and the Presi-
dent decided to promulgate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
Since 1952, the Tate Letter, announcing the policy on sovereign immunity of the
United States, remained the only guideline given to the United States State Depart-
ment for deciding immunity issues. Consequently, immunity decisions frequently were
inconsistent. See id. at 268-70 (noting that the State Department decided immunity
claims on a case-by-case basis, depending on whether the Tate Letter mandated a de-
nial of immunity). Thus, Congress found it necessary to transfer immunity determina-
tions from the executive to the judiciary. SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 9.
79. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982) (stating
that states are not immune from the jurisdiction of American courts where commercial
activities are concerned); U.K. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 3 (providing that states
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the American test for assessing whether a state's activity should be
considered public or private.8 0 According to this test, the nature of an
activity and not its purpose determines whether it is commercial or
sovereign.8 '
III. THE INJURY TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY EXCEPTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. EXTENSION OF THE RESTRICTIVE THEORY: THE NEED FOR
JUDICIAL REMEDIES
The exception to sovereign immunity for torts that cause injury to
persons or damage to property is an extension of the restrictive the-
ory. 2 International law recognizes that in commercial situations parties
injured by foreign governments deserve to have their rights determined
in a court of law.83 It is increasingly acknowledged that victims of non-
commercial torts should also have access to these jurisdictional reme-
dies.84 Under the restrictive theory, states that commit torts incur lia-
may not claim immunity with respect to proceedings regarding commercial transac-
tions); Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, AusTL AcTs P. § 11 (1985) (estab-
lishing that states are not immune from proceedings in Australian courts concerning
commercial dealings).
80. See Weber, supra note 14, at 20 n.128 (detailing numerous European courts
that applied the FSIA's nature versus purpose test); United Kingdom Questionnaire,
supra note 66, at 625 (explaining that the exceptions to immunity set forth in the
English Act focus on the objective nature of an activity rather than on the purpose of
the transaction, even though the Act does not explicitly require that the nature of an
activity be the determinative inquiry).
81. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982) (defining
"commercial activity" as a regular course of commercial conduct or a specific transac-
tion of a commercial nature). For instance, if the nature of the state activity were a
commercial contract, the state would not be immune from jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the activity served an important government purpose. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 56, at 27 (giving an example of a commercial transaction); United Kingdom
Questionnaire, supra note 66, at 625 (illustrating that an English court would deny
immunity to a foreign state in a dispute concerning a contract for the sale of goods,
regardless of whether the contract served a sovereign or public function).
82. See Van Walt Interview, supra note 8 (affirming that the non-commercial torts
exception to immunity is a natural extension of the internationally recognized restric-
tive theory); Summary Records of the Meetings of the Thirty-Fifth Session, [1983] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983 [hereinafter IL.C. Sum-
mary Records] (discussing the emerging trend towards restricting immunity in cases
concerning injury to persons or damage to property). Increasing international accept-
ance of domestic court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns committing non-commercial
torts stems from the principles of justice and reasonableness, which originally fueled
the restrictive theory of immunity. Id.
83. Tate Letter, supra note 57, at 985.
84. See Fifth Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 7 (arguing that the failure to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign states that commit torts leaves injured parties remedi-
less and without alternate recourse); LL.C. Summary Records, supra note 82, at 75
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bility as though they were private entities, just as they would if they
had committed commercial delicts.85 Thus, several state statutes, 86 the
European Convention, 7 the International Law Commission Report88
and the International Law Association Report" refuse to grant immu-
nity to foreign sovereigns that commit torts causing personal injury or
property damage.90
(declaring that the injury to persons or damage to property exception upholds justice).
The inability of local courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns committing
torts results in a legal vacuum that leaves the victim at the mercy of the foreign nation.
Id. at 77. Diplomatic negotiations are an inadequate substitute for local court jurisdic-
tion because they fail to produce specific determinations of legal rights and obligations
under domestic law and public international law. Id. at 90.
85. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1982) (establishing
that a state which is not immune from jurisdiction is liable in the same fashion and to
the same degree as a private entity under similar circumstances); THIRD RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 14, § 454 comment b (stating that the restrictive theory assimilates
the liability of foreign governments to that of private entities, regardless of whether the
government has committed an intentional wrong or has simply been negligent).
86. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982) (pro-
viding that states are not immune from jurisdiction where "money damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property");
U.K. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 5 (establishing that states are not immune to pro-
ceedings for "(a) death or personal injury; or (b) damage to or loss of tangible prop-
erty"); Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. § 13 (1985) (stipu-
lating that under Australian law, states are not immune from proceedings concerning
"(a) the death of, or personal injury to, a person; or (b) loss of or damage to tangible
property caused by an act or omission done or omitted to be done in Australia"); Cana-
dian State Immunity Act, CAN. REv. STAT. 1 6 (1981), reprinted in Materials on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, at 7, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/20 (1982) (proclaiming that under Canadian law states may not receive juris-
dictional immunity in proceedings relating to "(a) any death or personal injury, or (b)
any damage to or loss of property that occurs in Canada"); South African Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act 1 6 (1981), reprinted in Materials on Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of States and Their Property, supra note 66, at 34 (stating that South African
courts have jurisdiction over proceedings concerning "(a) the death or injury of any
person; or (b) damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission in
the Republic"); Singapore State Immunity Act % 7 (1979), reprinted in Materials on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, supra note 66, at 28 (af-
firming that a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of local courts in mat-
ters pertaining to "(a) death or personal injury; or (b) damage to or loss of tangible
property, caused by an act or omission in Singapore"). While all six statutes codify the
non-commercial torts exception to sovereign immunity, this Comment only discusses
the American, English, and Australian statutes.
87. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 11 (providing that domestic courts
have jurisdiction over foreign states in proceedings relating to "redress for personal
injury or damage to tangible property.").
88. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 74, art. 14 (establish-
ing that states are not immune from suits arising from death or injury, or damage to
tangible property).
89. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 75, art. III(F) (setting forth
death or personal injury, or damage to property as an exception to immunity).
90. See Fifth Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 12-17 (discussing national
legislation, the European Convention, and international opinions which established non-
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B. DEPARTURE FROM THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOVEREIGN AND
PRIVATE ACTIVITIES
The non-commercial torts exception to sovereign immunity is not
based on the traditional distinction between private or jure imperii
acts, and public or jure gestionis acts." Indeed, the denial of immunity
for injury to persons or damage to property applies to all torts, includ-
ing those committed during an exercise of sovereign power . 2 Rather
than relying on the distinction between sovereign and private activities,
jurisdiction over foreign states that injure persons or damage property
is based on the principle of territoriality.93
immunity for states causing personal injuries or damage to property); see also L.C.
Commission Report, supra note 65, at 76 (explaining that the I.L.C.'s Fifth Report
considers state practice, which the Special Rapporteur gleaned through judicial deci-
sions, national legislation, international conventions, and international legal writers).
91. See Fifth Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 6 (asserting that domestic
courts have jurisdiction over states which perform tortious acts that could be catego-
rized as acta jure imperii and that are not commercial in character). The distinction
between governmental and private acts has little or no bearing on the non-commercial
exception to immunity. Id. The Australian Law Reform Commission indicates that any
single distinction between private or commercial acts and governmental or sovereign
acts is artificial. AUsTRALIAN LAW REraout ComussioN, supra note 67, at 50.
The Commission even refuses to adopt this formulaic dichotomy for its commercial
exception to immunity. Indeed, the Australian Law Reform Commission Report states
that the nature versus purpose test used by the United States and other countries to
assess the character of an activity is unworkable. Id. at 50-51. The Australian Foreign
States Immunities Act of 1985 follows the Commission's recommendations and pro-
vides its own definition of what constitutes commercial activity. See Auctralian Foreign
States Immunities Act, AUSTL. Acts P. § 11(3) (1985) (defining "commercial transac-
tion"). Finally, the Australian approach affords greater flexibility to injured parties,
who may sue a foreign state for a tort under the commercial exception if the suit
cannot be brought under the tort exception. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM CONM.issiON,
supra note 67, at 51.
The International Law Association's Report supports the traditional distinction be-
tween governmental and private acts when it provides that a state is generally immune
from jurisdiction for its sovereign acts. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note
75, art. II. The Report enumerates, however, a series of exceptions to immunity which
grant domestic courts jurisdiction over states regardless of the sovereign or private na-
ture of the state acts. Id. art. III.
92. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 66 (interpreting the
recommended exception to immunity for personal injury or damage to property); see
LL.C. Commission Report, supra note 65, at 27 (noting that sovereign immunity may
be restricted irrespective of the capacity in which the foreign government acted or the
category of the activities conducted by the state); see also infra note 108 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the landmark case in the United States which obviated the dis-
tinction between sovereign and private acts in immunity determinations).
93. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 21, at 274 (defining territorial sovereignty as the
privilege which grants a state exclusive power to regulate and enforce decisions pertain-
ing to its territory and population); LL.C. Commission Report, supra note 65, at 19
(stating that the legal basis for the non-commercial torts exception is derived from the
link between the location where the illegal act was committed and the physical nature
of the harm perpetrated); INTERNATIONAL LAW COMtISSION, SixTH REPORT OF THE
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Territorial sovereignty implies that foreign states have no privilege to
commit torts of any kind in other jurisdictions. 4 Domestic courts have
jurisdiction over foreign governments in non-commercial torts situa-
tions because states have no right to commit local offenses.95 Further-
more, since the non-commercial torts exception to immunity is based on
the concept of territoriality, it does not violate the fundamental princi-
ple of state equality that initially gave rise to the absolute theory of
immunityY6
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/376/1984 (affirming
that the principle of territoriality overrides all other principles, notably that of sover-
eign immunity); Fifth Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 15 (arguing that the
locus delicti commissi, the place where the tortious act was committed, presents an
internationally accepted criterion for the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns).
94. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 67; Fifth Report of
the LL.C., supra note 65, at 8 (affirming that a state which conducts activities in a
foreign nation must respect local laws and regulations). Immunity must be denied to
foreign states that commit torts abroad to protect the citizens, residents, and tourists of
the forum state. Id. Indeed, rigid concepts of sovereign immunity should not affect a
foreign state's obligation to respect local laws, which are created to protect people
within the territory of the forum nation. LL.C. Summary Records, supra note 82, at
77. Finally, every state has an interest in restricting the immunity of foreign nations in
cases concerning injury to persons or damage to property because the need to safeguard
people within the state's borders overrides the fear of disrupting friendly diplomatic
relations with foreign sovereigns. Id. at 87. Ultimately, suits for non-commercial torts
against foreign states do not impede international relations to such a degree as to su-
persede the need to provide a judicial forum for victims of illegal activity. Id. at 88.
95. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 69; LL.C. Summary
Records, supra note 82, at 77 (arguing that granting jurisdiction to courts in the state
where the tort occurs encourages predictable judgments, uniform results, and effective
administration of justice); Fifth Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 7 (asserting
that the exercise of jurisdiction by a court located in the country where the damage
occurs offers the best guarantee that justice will quickly and soundly be served). Do-
mestic court jurisdiction represents the most convenient means of adjudication and
takes advantage of local facilities for establishing or disproving evidence and determin-
ing compensation. Id.
96. LL.C. Summary Records, supra note 82, at 75 (finding that the non-commer-
cial torts exception to immunity does not defeat the sovereign equality of states); Fifth
Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 8 (establishing that state sovereignty is not
challenged when states are internationally responsible for injuries to persons or damage
to property). Assisting an injured party in obtaining justice is not contrary to statehood
or sovereignty. Id. Indeed, the non-commercial torts exception to immunity may be
considered an extension of state practice allowing citizens to sue states domestically for
government caused injuries. LL.C. Summary Records, supra note 82, at 87. Further-
more, granting jurisdiction to local courts actually reinforces the sovereignty of the
forum state, as it allows the forum nation to assume legal control over the activities
occurring within its borders. Id. at 90. Finally, removing the blanket rule of immunity
in situations involving non-commercial torts does not deny the foreign sovereign its
right to defend itself. Id. at 79. It merely eliminates the procedural bar to the initiation
of legal proceedings. Id.
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C. JURISDICTIONAL LINKS TO THE FORUM STATE
Various codifications of the non-commercial torts exception to immu-
nity establish different jurisdictional requirements regarding the loca-
tion of the injurious act, the occurrence of damages, and the presence
of the perpetrator in the forum state. When the government's tortious
conduct and the injury itself both occur in the forum state, a domestic
court has the strongest case for maintaining jurisdiction over the for-
eign nation. When the state's tortious acts occur in one nation and
the damage occurs in another, or when the acts which cause the injury
take place in different nations, the jurisdiction of the domestic court
will depend on the particular jurisdictional links required in the appli-
cable codification of sovereign immunity.
Only the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act bases the
jurisdiction of local courts on whether the injury occurs in the United
States.9" The United Kingdom State Immunity Act,90 the Australian
Foreign States Immunities Act,100 and the International Law Associa-
tion Report 01 grant jurisdiction to domestic courts if the act that
causes the injury occurs in the forum state. The European Conven-
tion10 2 and the International Law Commission Report 03 limit sovereign
97. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 66 (noting that
when the illegal act and the injury take place in the same state, the local court provides
the obvious and convenient remedy).
98. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982) (pro-
viding that states are not immune from local jurisdiction if the injury to person or
damage to property occurs in the United States); TwRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14,
§ 454 comment e (elaborating that a court in the United States may only have jurisdic-
tion over a foreign government if the injury occurs in the United States, irrespective of
the location of the act or omission which caused the damage). Even if indirect effects of
the injury are experienced in the United States, this fact would not suffice to grant
jurisdiction to a domestic court. Id.
99. U.K. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 5 (establishing that states are not immune
for injuries to persons or damage to property performed in the United Kingdom).
100. Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, AusTL Acrs P. § 13 (1985) (stip-
ulating that Australian domestic courts may hear cases concerning injury to persons or
damage to property that foreign states perpetrate in Australia).
101. INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOCIA ON, supra note 75, art. III, § F (providing
that the non-commercial torts exception applies only if the act which causes the dam-
age occurs at least in part in the forum state).
102. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 11 (affirming that a state may not
claim immunity if the injury takes place in the state or the perpetrator of the damage
is present in the state when the injury occurs).
103. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 74, art. 14 (stating
that a foreign sovereign cannot assert immunity if the harmful act occurs wholly or
partially in the forum state and the perpetrator of the act is present in that territory
when the act takes place); see .L.C. Summary Records, supra note 82, at 76 (re-
vealing that the Special Rapporteur of the I.L.C. believed that domestic courts should
have jurisdiction over foreign nations even when the illegal act is committed in one
state and the results occur in another). Yet, the Special Rapporteur feared that the
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immunity only if the tortious activity occurs in the forum state and the
perpetrator of the injury was present in the forum state at the time the
damage took place.' 0 ' In addition, the I.L.C. and I.L.A. Reports adopt
a slightly more flexible approach by granting jurisdiction to domestic
courts as long as the tortious act occurred at least partially within the
forum state.10 5 Thus, the success of a claim against a foreign sovereign
for injury to persons or damage to property depends on whether the
particular jurisdictional requirements of the relevant immunity law are
met.
D. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT'S DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION: TERRORISM AS A FOREIGN POLICY OPTION?
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act contains a pro-
vision not present in other non-commercial torts codifications. This pro-
vision proclaims that a foreign government retains its immunity, even
when it has injured persons or damaged property, if the plaintiffs
claim is based on a state exercise of a "discretionary act."106 Discre-
tionary acts may include the initiation of operations, the formulation of
plans, and the acts of state agents executing those governmental
activities.1
07
non-commercial torts exception established in the I.L.C. Report does not cover such
situations. Id.
104. See Comment, Immunity of States, supra note 16, at 1859-60 (criticizing the
requirement that the perpetrator of the injury be in the forum state); I.L.C. Summary
Records, supra note 82, at 76 (questioning whether the presence reservation is justified
in view of the current increase in terrorism). State practice does not reflect the require-
ment that the author of the injury be present in the forum at the time of the illegal act.
Id.
105. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 74, at 14; INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 75, art. III, § F; see Comment, Immunity of
States, supra note 16, at 1858 (noting the importance of recognizing that a series of
acts in various nations may cause an injury).
106. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1982) (stat-
ing that the injury to persons or damage to property exception to sovereign immunity
does not apply to a claim based on the performance or non-performance of a discretion-
ary act, regardless of whether an abuse of discretion exists). This provision of the FSIA
is modeled after a corresponding provision in the United States Federal Tort Claims
Act. United States Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(a), (h)
(1982); TIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 454 comment d; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 56, at 20. The United States Supreme Court established that an act is
discretionary under the Federal Tort Claims Act if "there is room for policy judgment
and decision." Note, The Letelier Case: Foreign Sovereign Liability for Acts of Politi-
cal Assassination, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 262 (1981) [hereinafter Note, The Letelier
Case] (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953)).
107. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 454 reporters' note 3 (describing acts
which previous judicial decisions have labeled discretionary); see BLACK'S LAW DIC-
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In the 1980 landmark case Letelier v. Republic of Chile,10  an
American court held that a foreign state never has discretion to commit
an illegal act.10 9 Letelier involved a suit against the Chilean govern-
ment, which orchestrated the assassination of the former Chilean for-
eign minister Orlando Letelier on September 21, 1976 in Washington,
D.C. 10 This was the first time that the non-commercial torts provision
of the FSIA granted an American court jurisdiction over a foreign gov-
ernment sponsoring terrorism.' While the Chilean government argued
that the injury to persons or damage to property provision in the FSIA
refers only to torts such as automobile accidents, the court held that
the provision applies to all tort actions not covered by the commercial
exception. 1 " Thus, Letelier set a clear precedent for denying immunity
to states conducting terrorist activities in foreign countries.11 3
TIONARY, supra note 8, at 419 (defining a discretionary act as an act for which no
course of conduct is legally required).
108. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), cert. denied
471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
109. Id. at 673. The Letelier court held:
[T]here is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or agents commit, an
illegal act .... Whatever policy options may exist for a foreign country, it has
no "discretion" to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assassination of an
individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of hu-
manity as recognized in both national and international law. Id.
110. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. at 665.
111. Singer, Terrorism, Extradition, and FSIA Relief. The Letelier Case, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 67 (1986) (concluding that Letelier proved to be a
landmark case which provided the means to confront state-sponsored terrorism); Lete-
lier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. at 671 (specifying that because the FSIA is the
sole standard by which claims of immunity may be decided in the United States, dis-
tinctions between public and private government acts no longer determine whether a
foreign government is immune from local jurisdiction); Note, Sovereign Immunity. Ju-
risdiction Over Foreign States Committing Torts in the United States, 21 HARV. IrNr'L
L.J. 793, 797 (1980) (arguing that the Letelier court repudiated the notion that the
distinction between public and private acts constitutes the threshold determination of
whether a state may invoke sovereign immunity); Note, The Letelier Case, supra note
106, at 253 (finding that Letelier requires that immunity decisions be based solely on
the FSIA and not on customary distinctions between sovereign and commercial acts).
112. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. at 671-72 (referring to the Senate
and House Reports on the FSIA which specify that although the non-commercial torts
exception mainly addresses transportation accidents, the provision is cast in general
terms which include all tort claims for money damages); SENATE REPORT, supra note
56, at 20; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 56, at 20-21 (refusing to limit the injury to
persons or damage to property exception to automobile accidents).
113. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. at 673 (refusing to grant dis-
cretion to foreign governments committing illegal acts).
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E. THE NEED FOR JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
In spite of the precedent established in Letelier 1 4 for granting do-
mestic courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, the case revealed an
urgent need to establish a mechanism for enforcing judgments against
foreign nations." 5 While the Letelier court ordered Chile to pay dam-
ages to the victim's family, the Chilean government refused to comply
with the judgment." 6 The injured party attempted to establish jurisdic-
tion to collect damages under the FSIA provision which permits execu-
tion upon the property of a foreign state." 7 Letelier's family has not
yet received the compensation to which it is entitled, however, because
the FSIA only allows execution upon foreign property for claims
brought under the commercial exception to immunity."" Furthermore,
the FSIA mandates that the foreign property be directly related to the
plaintiff's claim." 9 Since the Letelier court initially granted relief to
the injured party under the non-commercial torts exception, it refused
to enforce its judgment under the commercial exception. 20 The unjust
result of Letelier will undoubtedly recur as long as courts require a
nexus between non-commercial torts claims and the foreign property
114. Id. at 665.
115. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 71 (remarking
that little value exists in granting rights to victims of illegal government acts by re-
stricting jurisdictional immunity if the judgments obtained cannot be enforced). Exer-
cising jurisdiction over a foreign state includes the right to enforce the resulting judg-
ment by necessary means. Id.
116. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(stating that the 1983 case arises from Letelier's attempt to enforce the judgment en-
tered against Chile); Note, The Letelier Case, supra note 106, at 70 (noting that al-
though the Letelier court ordered Chile to pay damages to Letelier's family, the FSIA
provided no means for enforcing the judgment).
117. Singer, supra note 111, at 70-71 (recounting that when the Chilean govern-
ment refused to comply with the judgment, Letelier's family attempted to secure their
compensation by filing suit against the state-owned Chilean National Airline, which
had assisted the Chilean agents in executing the assassination).
118. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1982) (establishing
that foreign property used in the United States for commercial purposes may be at-
tached to execute a judgment).
119. Id. (stating that the property must be used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is founded, unless the state owning the property waives its immunity
from execution or the judgment being enforced relates to property rights). Since states
do not readily waive their right to immunity from execution and most non-commercial
torts cases do not concern property rights, plaintiffs are left with the difficult task of
proving that their non-commercial claims are linked to commerce. Id. This requirement
that the claim itself be based on the property which the injured party is seeking to
attach is the most stringent requirement of all the codifications which deny immunity
from execution. Id.
120. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
the Chilean National Airline was not accountable for Chile's actions).
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sought to be levied.121 Indeed, non-commercial torts claims generally
are not linked to any property. 22 Thus, while the FSIA creates a right
for victims of terrorism under the injury to persons or damage to prop-
erty provision, it denies them a remedy.
All sovereign immunity codifications establish that a nation generally
may not attach foreign property in the forum state to satisfy a judg-
ment against a foreign government unless that government waives its
right to immunity from execution.1 23 Nevertheless, all codifications pro-
vide exceptions to this general rule of immunity from enforcement. The
exception to immunity in the United States FSIA is the least permis-
sive because it requires that the plaintiff's claim actually be based on
the foreign property sought to be attached. Other codifications permit
the enforcement of judgments concerning claims which bear only a re-
mote link to commercial activity.
1 24
121. Comment, Immunity of States, supra note 16, at 1867 (affirming that the
nexus requirement prevents victims of non-commercial torts from enforcing their judg-
ments through the commercial exception to immunity from execution).
122. See id. (citing cases in which non-commercial torts were not connected to any
property); AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 76 (arguing that
there is no justification for requiring the victim's claim to be linked to the property
executed upon). This limitation on enforcement invites the foreign state not to comply
with the judgment entered against it, since most claims are not related to specific prop-
erty. Id.
123. See, e.g., U.K. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 13(2)-(3) (providing that the
property of a foreign state may not be used for the execution of a judgment or arbitra-
tion award unless the foreign nation consents in writing); Australian Foreign States
Immunities Act, AUSTL. AcTs P. §§ 30-31 (1985) (stipulating that foreign property
may not be levied for judgment satisfaction); European Convention, supra note 72, art.
23 (affirming that no state may undertake measures of execution against another
state's property unless that state has expressly consented in writing). Immunity from
execution has traditionally been considered completely separate from jurisdictional im-
munity. See United Kingdom Questionnaire, supra note 66, at 629 (explaining that
since jurisdictional immunity is a separate issue from execution immunity, a waiver in
jurisdictional proceedings does not obviate the need for a separate waiver in execution
proceedings); AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMSSION, supra note 67, at 71 (noting
that the courts treat execution immunity separately from jurisdictional immunity).
124. See U.K. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 13(4) (providing that a court may
enforce a judgment by levying property which is currently in use or intended for use in
commercial activities). The English statute carves an exemption for states party to the
1972 European Convention on State Immunity from this exception to immunity from
execution. Id. In spite of this exemption for several favored nations, the State Immu-
nity Act constitutes a positive step toward judgment enforcement for England. Indeed,
prior to the Act, an English court had never attached the property of a foreign state to
execute a judgment. United Kingdom Questionnaire, supra note 66, at 629. See also
Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, AUSTL. AcTs P. §§ 32-33 (1985) (detailing
the types of commercial and immovable property that may be attached to secure a
judgment).
While all sovereign immunity laws allow a forum state to attach foreign property to
execute a judgment in limited situations, these laws also provide loopholes to judgment
enforcement. The Australian Act establishes that no penalties shall be imposed for any
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All sovereign immunity laws, however, fail to provide for the en-
forcement of judgments rendered under the non-commercial torts ex-
ception. As a result, sovereign immunity laws grant greater immunity
from enforcement of judgments than from adjudicatory jurisdiction
over claims which are unrelated to commercial activity.125 Victims of
non-commercial torts will remain uncompensated under the injury to
persons or damage to property exception to sovereign immunity until
this discrepancy is eliminated.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The sovereign immunity principle must not be permitted to shield
states from their responsibility for their criminal activities under inter-
national law.12 Since sovereign immunity does not mitigate the liabil-
ity incurred by governments pursuing international terrorism, jurisdic-
tional considerations must not prevent injured parties from holding
these governments liable and receiving adequate relief. International
law imposes fundamental restrictions on sovereign power.1 27 Indeed,
numerous treaties and conventions prohibit states from conducting ter-
failure to conform to a judgment rendered against a foreign government in an Austra-
lian court. Id. at § 34. See also European Convention, supra note 72, art. 20(2)(a)
(providing that a contracting state need not enforce a judgment that is manifestly con-
trary to its public policy); Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 74,
Part IV, art. 22 (setting forth the parameters of immunity from enforcement); INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 75, art. VIII(A)(3). The I.L.A. Report also
states that in exceptional circumstances, a domestic court may order interim measures
against foreign property if the injured party presents a prima facie case that the prop-
erty risks being removed. Id. art. VIII(D). This provision, however, generally does not
appear to ensure the enforcement of judgments issued under the non-commercial torts
exception. Id.
125. Comment, Immunity of States, supra note 16, at 1862-63 (commenting that
while all states offer greater immunity from execution than from jurisdiction, the dis-
crepancy is particularly striking in the I.L.C. draft).
126. See Paust, supra note 67, at 223-25 (stating that foreign governments are not
immune from jurisdiction when they violate human rights, the laws of war and geno-
cide, interdictions on apartheid, or when they obstruct self-determination or pursue in-
ternational terrorism).
127. Comment, Implied Waiver, supra note 59, at 382-83 (stating that sovereigns
should not have absolute power so that international relations do not become chaotic).
Since the Nuremberg Trials, which established that individuals must disregard im-
moral superior orders for the sake of a higher moral law, nations increasingly recognize
the principle of jus cogens. Id. at 385-86. According to this concept, nations may not
violate peremptory norms of international law, which deserve absolute protection. Id. at
387. Thus, foreign governments are not entitled to immunity when they conduct activi-
ties which violate jus cogens norms. Id. at 396.
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rorist activities.128 It is essential that sovereign immunity considerations
not be allowed to thwart the intent of these treaties and conventions.
A. DOMESTIC COURT JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
1. The Injury to Persons or Damage to Property Exception
The most viable means of holding states liable for their acts of ter-
rorism is to grant domestic courts jurisdiction over foreign govern-
ments. The effective way of achieving this jurisdiction under existing
law is to allow injured parties to file claims for state-sponsored terror-
ism under the injury to persons or damage to property exception to
immunity. Letelier proved that this exception provides a remedy
against state-sponsored terrorism. The International Law Commission
also proclaimed that the non-commercial torts exception to immunity
covers intentional damage to property, arson, and political assassina-
tion.129 Under this definition of the non-commercial torts exception,
Greenpeace could have sued the French government for its bombing of
the Rainbow Warrior in a domestic court in New Zealand.1 30 Tribunals
throughout the world must be more willing to adopt the Letelier court's
and the International Law Commission's interpretation of the non-com-
mercial torts exception to establish jurisdiction over foreign govern-
ments which commit international crimes.
2. The International Agreements and Implied Waiver Theories
Aside from the injury to persons or damage to property exception,
two other theories may grant domestic courts jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns. The first approach, entitled the "international agreements"
128. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988); Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, adopted by G.A.
Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980);
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplo-.
matic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 1035 U.N.T.S. 167;
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 LEAOUE OF NATIONS
OJ. 23 (1938), reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORIS.t: Docu.iENTs OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 253 (1979).
129. Fifth Report of the LL.C, supra note 65, at 8 (affirming that the injury to
persons or damage to property exception covers not only transportation accidents but
also crimes such as murder and political assassination).
130. See Clark, supra note 6, at 401-06 (arguing that the French destruction of the
Greenpeace vessel was a terrorist act).
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exception to immunity,' 3 1 applies to the United States FSIA provision
establishing that a foreign government is not immune from jurisdiction
if an international agreement precludes immunity.1 32 This provision sig-
nifies that international agreements denying sovereign immunity over-
ride the FSIA provisions granting immunity. 33
This exception's ability to deny immunity to states sponsoring terror-
ism depends on the interpretation of "international agreements." Under
a liberal interpretation of the provision, an agreement made after the
United States enacted the FSIA overrides FSIA immunity require-
ments.3 Consequently, the international agreements provision will be-
come an even more powerful instrument for securing judgments against
foreign sovereigns when nations promulgate additional international
agreements proscribing terrorism.
According to the expansive interpretation of the international agree-
ments exception, customary international law precludes grants of im-
munity under the FSIA as effectively as written treaties.135 When spon-
soring terrorism, a foreign sovereign is not immune from prosecution
since customary international law proscribes criminal activity.136 A lib-
eral construction of the international agreements provision thus consti-
tutes an effective means of denying immunity to nations conducting
terrorism.
A second theory for securing jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns,
aside from the injury to persons or damage to property exception, is the
"implied waiver" approach. This concept is rooted in sovereign immu-
131. Paust, supra note 67, at 234 (explaining that the international agreements
exception to immunity functions as an alternative to the FSIA provision denying immu-
nity for injury to persons or damage to property).
132. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) (establishing
that immunity grants are subject to international agreements to which the United
States was a party when the Congress of the United States passed the FSIA); see
United States Questionnaire, supra note 66, at 633 (citing eleven treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation enacted between the United States and nations around the
world as examples of agreements that take precedence over FSIA allowances of
immunity).
133. See United States Questionnaire, supra note 66, at 633 (asserting that the
FSIA clearly stipulates that international agreements concerning sovereign immunity
prevail over FSIA rules).
134. See Paust, supra note 67, at 234-35 (arguing that any applicable international
agreement denying jurisdictional immunity overrides FSIA provisions allowing immu-
nity, regardless of whether the agreement existed when Congress passed the FSIA).
135. See id. at 235 (suggesting that the international agreements provision applies
to international criminal activities for which states were not immune from jurisdiction
under customary international law).
136. See id. at 237 (arguing that Letelier could also have been decided under the
international agreements exception, because international law does not grant foreign
governments discretion to conduct political assassinations).
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nity codifications that recognize explicit and implicit waivers of immu-
nity.137 Internationally accepted instances of implied waivers include
situations in which a foreign state participates in the proceedings of the
forum state or consents to arbitration. 138
In addition, some authorities assert that waivers must be implied
when a nation acts in a flagrantly reprehensible manner. An offending
nation implicitly waives its right to immunity because it may not ex-
pect to receive immunity when violating international law.139 Indeed,
when a state commits an international crime such as terrorism, it
behaves outside its sovereign capacity. 40 Consequently, that state loses
its right to immunity through constructive waiver by operation of inter-
national law. 41
3. A Potential State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception
Amending the existing codifications of sovereign immunity to include
a specific exception for state-sponsored terrorism is another means of
137. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982) (pro-
viding that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction when that state waives its
right to immunity either explicitly or implicitly); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
supra note 75, art. III(A) (affirming that sovereign immunity will be denied when a
foreign state has waived its immunity expressly or implicitly); Weber, supra note 14, at
28-29 (establishing that a waiver may exist by express agreement or by acquiescence).
138. See Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, AUSTL. Acts P. §§ 10, 17
(1985) (recognizing implied waivers when a foreign state submits to the jurisdiction of
local Australian courts or consents to arbitral proceedings); U.K. State Immunity Act,
1978, §§ 2(1), 9(1) (following the implied waiver theory by specifying that foreign
states shall not be granted sovereign immunity when they submit to the jurisdiction of
English courts or agree to arbitration); European Convention, supra note 72, arts. 2, 3,
12 (establishing that a foreign state may not claim immunity when it submits to the
jurisdiction of the forum court, participates in the litigation concerning the merits of
the claim, or agrees to submit to arbitration); Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties, supra note 74, arts. 9, 20 (denying immunity to foreign states that participate in
the proceedings of a forum court or consent to arbitration); United States Question-
naire, supra note 66, at 632 (noting that examples of implicit waivers include situations
where a foreign state agrees to submit its dispute to arbitration or to follow the law of
the forum nation); Weber, supra note 14, at 28-29 (noting that a state may implicitly
waive its right to jurisdictional immunity when it makes a court appearance or con-
ducts itself in a manner which clearly implies that it does not intend to raise a claim of
immunity).
139. See Comment, Implied Waiver, supra note 59, at 394-401 (arguing that the
implied waiver provision grants jurisdiction to the courts of the United States over
nations which violate peremptory norms of international law); see also supra note 126-
128 and accompanying text (discussing that states should not have the right to jurisdic-
tional immunity when they commit torts in violation of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law, known as jus cogens norms).
140. See Comment, Implied Waiver, supra note 59, at 396 (asserting that jurisdic-
tional immunity should not be extended to states which violate Jus cogens norms).
141. See id. at 398 (asserting that international law concepts of jus cogens man-
date constructive waivers of immunity through operation of international law).
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establishing jurisdiction over foreign states in domestic courts. It re-
mains doubtful, however, that nations will agree to such an explicit
provision because they are concerned with preserving their political and
economic relations with other countries. Thus, the injury to persons or
damage to property exception offers the most realistic channel of relief
to victims of state-sponsored terrorism.
4. Judgment Execution
Regardless of the theory used to establish domestic jurisdiction, a
mechanism must be created for enforcing judgments against foreign
states. 42 Current codifications of the non-commercial torts exception to
immunity deny jurisdictional immunity while granting immunity from
judgment execution. 43 A possible solution to this enforcement problem
is to adopt the general models of the English and Australian Acts, the
International Law Commission Report and the International Law As-
sociation Report. These models allow judgments to be levied on the
commercial property of a foreign nation. To lend meaning to these in-
terpretations, however, lawmakers must add a clause specifying that
judgments rendered on a non-commercial torts claim may be enforced
by attaching foreign commercial property.
A preferable solution to the existing judgment execution loophole
may be to adopt the European Convention's approach. This Convention
requires states to abide by any judgment rendered by a domestic court
of another state, subject to exceptions.4 If this approach were fol-
lowed, it would be necessary to vitiate the existing exception to non-
immunity for judgments which foreign governments consider contrary
142. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 9 (addressing the problem of victims
who obtain judgments against a foreign sovereign but are unable to enforce the judg-
ment). The United States legislative history for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
indicates that one of the goals of the Act was to reduce the discrepancy between the
execution immunity rules and the jurisdiction immunity rules. Id. The execution provi-
sions in the Act sought to provide judgment creditors a remedy if a foreign state re-
fused to comply with a judgment entered against it. Id. While the legislative history for
the FSIA was primarily concerned with judgments rendered under the commercial ex-
ception to immunity, this rationale extends to the injury to persons or damage to prop-
erty exception. Id. at 20.
143. See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text (exploring the gap between
limited jurisdiction immunity and extensive enforcement immunity).
144. See European Convention, supra note 72, ch. III, art. 20(1) (listing conditions
mandating that contracting states give effect to adverse judgments issued by the court
of another contracting state); Resolution (72)2 of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe Concerning the European Convention on State Immunity, May 16,
1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74 (affirming that one of the main purposes of the European




to their public policy. 145 Either of these two approaches would elimi-
nate the current injustice of granting rights to injured parties while
preventing them from collecting compensation.
B. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
An alternate solution to granting jurisdiction to domestic courts over
foreign sovereigns is to allow arbitral tribunals to decide claims of
state-sponsored terrorism. A foreign state may agree to arbitration in
cases in which it would not voluntarily relinquish its right to immunity
from judicial jurisdiction. 4 Solving disputes through arbitration rather
than judicial settlement provides several advantages for the foreign
state. 47
First, arbitration mitigates the political stigma of a public trial, par-
ticularly if the parties agree to keep the award secret. 48 Second, arbi-
tration solves the dispute without subjecting a foreign nation to an un-
familiar jurisdiction.1 49 Finally, arbitration grants the parties more
flexibility by allowing them to appoint arbitrators of their choice, 80 es-
tablish procedure, and indicate applicable law. 151
145. See European Convention, supra note 72, ch. III, art. 2(a) (providing that a
contracting state may be exempt from enforcing a judgment of another contracting
state when enforcement is contrary to public policy). This type of loophole encourages
foreign states to flout judgments which are not in their favor and thus thwarts the
interests of the forum state. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFOzi COMUISSION, supra note
67, at 73-74 (affirming that the forum state's interest in allowing judgment creditors to
obtain satisfaction outweighs its reluctance to damage diplomatic and economic rela-
tions with a foreign sovereign).
146. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (discussing why France agreed
to arbitration with Greenpeace while it would probably have fought to retain immunity
had Greenpeace attempted to sue France in a New Zealand court).
147. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 589 (affirming that most states prefer
arbitration to other means of adjudication).
148. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 48(5), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1288 T.I.AS.
No. 6090, at 1314, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 188 [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Convention]
(establishing that the press may not publish awards without the consent of the parties);
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, Apr.
1, 1982, art. 32(5) (providing that the award may be revealed to the public only if both
parties consent).
149. Loftis, supra note 68, at 262 (arguing that arbitration enhances legal relations
by granting remedies to claimants without placing them in foreign jurisdictions).
150. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21,
1961, art. I, para. 2(b), 484 U.N.T.S. 364, 366, [hereinafter European Arbitration
Convention] (noting that arbitrators may be chosen on an ad hoc basis, or by perma-
nent arbitral institutions).
151. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 587-88; 1. BROWNUE, supra note 21,
at 544 (stating that arbitration is more flexible than compulsory jurisdiction).
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International arbitrations are a promising alternative to domestic
court jurisdiction over foreign states because they do not raise sover-
eign immunity issues and are legally binding. 52 However, arbitration
awards face the same enforcement problems as judicial settlements
when the losing party refuses to comply with the award.15 3 The crucial
question becomes whether domestic courts may have jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns to execute the arbitral award.'54 Recent cases, stat-
utes, and treaties establishing international arbitration rules indicate a
trend toward liberalizing arbitration rules to increase award enforce-
ment.155 Furthermore, most sovereign immunity codifications provide
that a state which submits to arbitration waives its right to protest do-
152. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958, art. III, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40 [hereinafter New York Arbitration
Convention] (ordering that states accept arbitral rulings as binding and enforce them
according to applicable procedural rules); ICSID Arbitration Convention, supra note
148, preamble, art. 53(1) (asserting that arbitration awards are unappealable and bind-
ing on the parties unless the Convention provides for other relief); Convention for the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at Geneva, Sept. 26, 1927, art. 1, 92
L.N.T.S 302, 305 [hereinafter Geneva Arbitration Convention] (stating that arbitral
awards made pursuant to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses are binding);
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of Panama, Jan.
30, 1975, art. 4, OAS/Ser. A/20 (SEPF) reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter Inter-American Arbitration Convention] (providing that definitive arbitral awards
have the force of final judicial judgments); United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1975, art.
3(2) (stipulating that any award made under the New York Arbitration Convention is
binding); United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) (establishing
that courts of the United States shall enforce the New York Arbitration Convention).
153. See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text (analyzing the need to create
a mechanism for enforcing judicial settlements).
154. See supra notes 138 and accompanying text (discussing arbitration as a
waiver of sovereign immunity).
155. See Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration, 38 ARB.
J. 34, 35 (1983) (affirming that modern state statutes and conventions have expanded
transnational arbitration rules and increased the effectiveness of arbitral awards
against foreign states); id. at 45 (explaining that the ICSID Arbitration Convention
prevents a foreign state from raising a defense of sovereign immunity when a domestic
court attempts to enforce an arbitral award). Under the ICSID Arbitration Conven-
tion, a foreign government waives a claim of immunity when immunity would obstruct
ICSID procedures and contradict the foreign state's consent to arbitration. Id.; see
Loftis, supra note 68, at 243-46 (arguing that recent case law reveals that consent to
arbitration constitutes a waiver of immunity regarding award enforcement); ICSID Ar-
bitration Convention, supra note 148, art. 54 (establishing that federal courts of the
states that are parties to the Convention must enforce arbitral awards as if they were
final judicial settlements); see also European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on
Arbitration, done at Strasbourg, Jan. 20, 1966, Europ. T.S. No. 56, art. 6, Annex arts.
29-31 [hereinafter European Uniform Arbitration Law] (stating that parties may agree
to an award enforcement formula); Geneva Arbitration Convention, supra note 152,
art. 5 (establishing that parties may execute their awards to the extent that the law or
the treaty obligations of the state where the award is sought to be enforced allows).
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mestic court jurisdiction if proceedings to enforce the arbitral award
become necessary. 156
Despite these arbitration and immunity laws that encourage award
enforcement, other statutory provisions and case law prevent domestic
courts from executing arbitration awards.157 Several arbitration stat-
utes and conventions contain execution loopholes, whereby state domes-
tic courts are not required to honor awards that are deemed contrary to
public policy. 158 Until it is internationally established that arbitral
awards are enforceable in domestic courts, award recipients will con-
tinue to be plagued by the same execution problems they would face in
a judicial settlement.15 9
In addition to award enforcement issues, victims of terrorism face
another obstacle to receiving compensation through arbitral proceed-
156. See, e.g., U.K. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 9(1) (establishing that a foreign
state is not immune to proceedings in English domestic courts relating to the enforce-
ment of an arbitral award); European Convention, supra note 72, art. 12 (stating that
a nation which agrees to arbitration may not claim immunity from local court jurisdic-
tion in proceedings concerning the arbitration); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOcATION,
supra note 75, art. III(A)(2)(b) (asserting that states which agree to submit their dis-
pute to an arbitral tribunal waive their immunity with respect to domestic proceedings
designed to enforce the award).
157. Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, AusTL AcTs P. § 17(2) (1985)
(establishing that foreign sovereigns are immune from local jurisdiction regarding the
execution of arbitral awards unless the domestic court could have exercised jurisdiction
over the foreign state regarding the initial claim); see AusTRAuAN LAW REFoas CO.,-
MISSION, supra note 67, at 62-63 (arguing that a foreign state which agrees to arbitra-
tion waives its right to sovereign immunity solely in those states that could have origi-
nally exercised jurisdiction over the underlying dispute); see also, Loftis, supra note 68,
at 246-51 (recounting the decisions of the United States which refused to view an
agreement to arbitrate as an implied waiver of jurisdictional immunity); Note, Arbitra-
tion Clauses as Waivers of Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution Under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMw. L. 409, 412-
23 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Arbitration Clauses as Waivers] (discussing the judicial
controversy over whether an agreement to submit to arbitration constitutes a waiver of
jurisdictional immunity in domestic courts).
158. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1978, § 5(3) (providing that the United
Kingdom does not have to enforce arbitral awards that contradict public policy); Inter-
American Arbitration Convention, supra note 152, art. 5(2)(b) (establishing that arbi-
tral decisions opposing the ordre public, or public policy, may be rejected); Geneva
Arbitration Convention, supra note 152, art. l(e) (affirming that valid awards must
comport with public policy); European Uniform Arbitration Law, supra note 155, art.
24 (stipulating that arbitral awards have the authority of res judicata unless they are
contrary to the ordre public). But see, ICSID Arbitration Convention, supra note 148,
art. 52 (omitting a public policy exception to award enforcement); Delaume, supra
note 155, at 45 (noting that the ICSID Arbitration Convention constitutes a major
improvement over previous codifications of arbitration because it contains no public
policy exception to the binding nature of awards).
159. See Note, Arbitration Clauses as Waivers, supra note 157, at 423, 425, 430
(arguing that an agreement to arbitrate must be construed as a waiver of jurisdiction
and execution immunity in order for arbitrations to resolve international disputes
successfully).
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ings. With the exception of the Rainbow Warrior affair, arbitral tribu-
nals have only settled disputes between states and private parties over
commercial issues. Most arbitration statutes and conventions address
only commercial claims.' 60 A few statutes and conventions, however,
are sufficiently general to encompass other disputes. 16 Nations should
expand international arbitration laws so that all codifications allow ar-
bitrations between states and private entities that are not linked to
commerce. Arbitral tribunals could then adjudicate claims of state-
sponsored terrorism.
The successful arbitration between France and Greenpeace in the
Rainbow Warrior affair demonstrates that international law is becom-
ing more receptive to allowing non-commercial arbitrations between
sovereign nations and private parties. Despite the difficulties involved in
securing arbitral awards, arbitration remains a viable means of protect-
ing the rights of victims of political terrorism and ensuring that com-
pensation is delivered.
CONCLUSION
With the increase in state-sponsored terrorism, it has become imper-
ative that private parties have rights and remedies against foreign gov-
ernments. Whenever a state conducts terrorist activities, it has a duty
to compensate all victims, whether they are public entities or private
persons. Conversely, an injured party should have access to legal reme-
dies regardless of whether the defendant is a state or a private entity.
62
Traditional principles of sovereign immunity must not prevent victims
160. See European Arbitration Convention, supra note 150, art. I, 1 l(a) (estab-
lishing that the Convention applies only to disputes arising from international trade);
ICSID Arbitration Convention, supra note 148, art. 1(2) (explaining that the Conven-
tion addresses investment disputes); Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done at Geneva,
Sept. 24, 1923, art. 1, 27 L.N.T.S. 158, 168 (providing that parties to a contract may
agree to submit a conflict concerning that contract to arbitration); Inter-American Ar-
bitration Convention, supra note 152, art. 1 (stating that parties may submit a dispute
regarding a commercial transaction to arbitration); The United States Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (stipulating that the Act concerns commercial and maritime
transactions).
161. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 152, art. II(1) (providing that
states must recognize arbitration agreements regardless of whether they concern a con-
tractual relationship); European Uniform Arbitration Law, supra note 155, preamble,
Annex I, art. I (establishing that the Convention covers civil and commercial matters,
and that any dispute which arises out of a particular legal relationship may be referred
to arbitration); United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1975, ch. 3, 1 1(2) (specifying that
the Act applies to all non-domestic arbitration agreements).
162. Fifth Report of the LL.C., supra note 65, at 7 (arguing that in the interest of




of terrorism from having their rights adjudicated in court. Indeed, the
respect that domestic courts normally pay to policy decisions of foreign
countries does not extend to criminal acts that violate fundamental
principles of international law.163 Since foreign states remain interna-
tionally responsible for their illegal actions, they must not circumvent
justice through jurisdictional stratagems.
Clearly the emerging trend in international law favors the injury to
persons or damage to property exception to immunity.'" Under this
exception, domestic courts now have jurisdiction over foreign states re-
gardless of whether the claim arises from a sovereign exercise of power.
Letelier demonstrates that the non-commercial torts exception is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass state terrorism. The Rainbow Warrior af-
fair further supports the precedent set in Letelier for preventing foreign
governments from invoking sovereign immunity in instances of state-
sponsored terrorism. When foreign governments realize that they may
not hide behind the sovereign immunity doctrine to shirk their interna-
tional obligations, they may reconsider engaging in terrorism.
163. Comment, Immunity of States, supra note 16, at 1880-81 (asserting that a
foreign nation's policy choices should not be recognized if that state intentionally com-
mits an illegal act in another jurisdiction).
164. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (supporting the international
trend toward denying immunity to state perpetrators of non-commercial torts).
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